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The diplomatic relations between Brazil and Angola can be traced 
from the independence of Angola in 1975 upon the pragmatic involvement of 
the Foreign Ministry, despite the internal pressures for bringing the country 
closer to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola that was being 
supported by the USSR and Cuba.3 In 2010 (Brasil 2010) the relationship 
changed from a pragmatic approach as started in 1975 to a strategic partner-
ship that consolidated the need for a South-South approach in the diplomacy 
to strengthen the autonomy through diversification of partners. Thus, the re-
lations between Brazil and Angola are a rich empirical field that goes beyond 
the rational actor model to an understanding of the diverse and complex na-
ture of the Global South and the participation of the new transnational actors 
in this scenario.
1  PhD in Law from Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Post-doc researcher from 
School of Law (Old College) of University of Edinburgh. Professor at Escola de Direito de São 
Paulo of Fundação Getulio Vargas. E-mail: andre.correa@fgv.br
2  Master in International Law from the Universidade de São Paulo and from Brigham Young 
University. PhD in Political Science from the Universidade de São Paulo. Post-doc researcher 
for Escola de Direito de São Paulo of Fundação Getulio Vargas. E-mail: douglas.castro@fgv.br
3  See Silva 2008.
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The reconstruction of Angola after its independence from Portugal 
and later with the end of the civil war in the 1990s depended on, and still 
depends on, largely on the foreign investments. Therefore, the country has 
offered incentives for investments whose utility aroused interests of Brazil, 
China and the former Soviet Union despite the risks presented naturally in 
a country with low political and institutional stability during the process of 
decolonization. This movement had Brazilian companies as important actors 
investing in the country upon receiving credit lines and incentives specially 
granted for this purpose.
 The stance adopted by Brazil in relation to its diplomatic objectives 
and the form of the rapprochement with Angola raises questions that guide 
the development of this work, namely: what is the reason that led Brazil to 
adopt an indirect influence exercise stance on Angola despite its explicit claim 
made by its foreign policy of the need to increase the South-South relations? 
How was the participation of Brazilian companies in this process and what 
were the implications of participation in the politics and in Angolan society?
The incentive for Brazilian participation in the process of reconstruc-
tion of Angola found an echo in the new orientation of Brazilian foreign pol-
icy that sought to identify new partners in the Global South with a view to 
modify the balance existing in the relationship with the North by the appli-
cation of the principle of autonomy through diversification. Thus, the initial 
conditions were generated by the international system that in the early 1970 
was tested with a growing number of decolonization processes in Africa, the 
oil crisis and the great dissatisfaction of the developing countries on how were 
treated by the developed North.
Considering this, the first initiatives of approach took place, having 
as one of its landmarks the construction of the hydroelectric of Capanda by 
Construtora Odebrecht (Odebrecht), which had already started its interna-
tionalization process by investing in the construction of a plant to provide 
power and irrigation in Olmos, Peru. The involvement of the Odebrecht in 
Angola followed an intermediate model to the Chinese model that is heavily 
dependent on the state and based on sending labor, and the Indian model that 
is fully driven by the private sector (Leite 2011). Brazil had to encourage and 
fund companies to participate in the country’s reconstruction efforts and at 
the same time led its foreign policy towards new partners to build new foun-
dations for cooperation.
Upon these initial considerations, the paper develops an analysis by 
considering two analytical dimensions: theoretical and empirical.
The theoretical dimension is a framework that accounts for transna-
tionalism and paradiplomacy. The hypothesis in this paper is based on the as-
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sumption that the participation of Odebrecht in rebuilding the infrastructure 
in Angola constitutes the practice of corporate paradiplomacy that promotes 
the transfer of economic, social and cultural capital to the recipient country, 
turning the company into an important transnational agent with direct politi-
cal and social influence over national and local society. In this sense, the con-
cept of transnationalism is associated with the activities of non-state actors on 
the international stage who are able to influence the policy-making process in 
the recipient states both politically and economically.
The rise of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) as important political 
actors in international relations is widely recognized by academics and policy 
makers due to their growing influence on transnational and local affairs. Ac-
cording to Stopford (1994, 274), one of the issues that this influence raises is 
connected to the competing interests represented by these corporations: “[…] 
if firms fail to rise to the challenge of acting more as diplomats and continue 
to act on the basis of short-run perceptions of shareholder requirements, they 
may provoke policy responses that are the opposite of longer-run shareholder 
interests.”.
In spite of that, the author argues that instead of waiting for govern-
ments to enact new rules for their participation in the economic and political 
processes in both domestic and international spheres, TNCs should inter-
vene and actively provoke policy responses by means of a triangular diploma-
cy strategy that will develop a greater degree of partnership between the TNCs 
and the states in pursuing wealth generation (Stopford 1994).
Stopford (1994) presents empirical evidence that points to the fact 
that TNCs have been acting in such a way since the 1970s. The author uses 
the case of General Motors in Brazil, in which the company policies required 
the establishment of a partnership with local suppliers and workers to set up 
the business, requiring that hundreds of the company’s engineers of spend 
long periods in Brazil to make sure local labor force and suppliers met the 
standards of the company in the U.S. Has this model been followed by the 
Brazilian TNCs during the internationalization process? In order to approach 
this question, I will firstly consider the case of the construction of the Capan-
da Hydroelectric Plant in Angola by Odebrecht. 
The international expansion of Odebrecht began in the 1980s after 
the signing of a contract with Angola agreeing to provide engineering services 
to build Capanda. 
The reconstruction process, the timing of the Brazilian TNCs interna-
tionalization, and the new Brazilian diplomatic approach successfully worked 
well together in the 1980s, as national and international variables combined. 
Therefore, the first steps towards the reconstruction of Angola and the con-
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solidation of the Brazilian diplomatic strategy to diversify partners have an 
important link to the construction of Capanda by Odebrecht due to the related 
facts discussed below. The Brazilian government not only provided political 
support, but funded the company through a special line of credit to participate 
in the efforts to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, as well as the infrastruc-
ture necessary for development, thus acting as a facilitator with private inter-
ests in expanding business to new markets while building the foundations for 
cooperation in the Global South. This specific case presents a paradigm that 
shows companies identifying opportunities and launching into new interna-
tional markets backed up by states, which consequently initiate state-state re-
lations (Coviello and Munro 1995). 
 The empirical dimension constitutes a survey and analysis of direct 
and indirect sources that account for the construction of Capanda and asso-
ciated initiatives implemented by Odebrecht in connection with the project, 
as well as its implications on Angolan society. The underlying strategy for 
this methodology is conducting a micro-analysis in which the case’s relevant 
context, facts, and patterns are examined to find the minimal conditions nec-
essary and evidence to support our theoretical claim and the implications for 
a future research agenda. 
Despite the difficulties that this research can present in terms of the 
difficult access or one-sidedness of the sources and the treatment of the data 
discovered within the theoretical framework, we expect to find the presence 
of the minimally sufficient conditions to confirm the feasibility of the theory 
presented in this study. Furthermore, the work will identify the additional 
implications of the presence of the CO in Angola, however, due to space con-
straints will not be explored here but will certainly contribute to an expansion 
and / or deepening of the research agendas that focus on this topic or related 
issues.
The construction of the Capanda Hydroelectric Power Plant 
by Odebrecht
The development of our analysis starts with the background condi-
tions in relation to both the internal political turmoil in Angola and the eco-
nomic external pressures that made it possible to accommodate public and 
private interests. Internally, the decolonization process left the country with 
an urgent need for structural and institutional reconstruction to provide basic 
public goods and services to the population. The international pressures gen-
erated by the Cold War upon marginalized countries, and severe economic 
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pressures arising from the oil crisis in the 1970’s initiated a revisionist pro-
cess in North-South relations. 
Angola’s internal context and international pressures 
 
The fight for independence lasted years; however, formal independ-
ence did not bring peace to the country, as the three national revolutionary 
groups that fought against Portugal began fighting each other for control 
of government institutions (Visentini 2012). The influence of the Cold War 
began to be felt within the country’s borders. The former USSR and Cuba 
supported the MPLA. South Africa supported UNITA. Zaire supported the 
FNLA, which also received the support from Chinese, Portuguese and Brit-
ish mercenaries, and South Africa. The United States initially supported the 
FNLA but soon started to help UNITA as well, thus, keeping a division strate-
gy in Angola (Whitaker 1970). 
The civil war lasted until 2002, in which period several attempts to 
promote peace were made with special emphasis on the Lusaka Agreement of 
1994 (Embaixada da República de Angola em Portugal 1994).
Externally, structural changes in the international system due to de-
colonization processes (especially in Africa) and the oil crisis in the 1970s had 
strong impacts on the South. Countries became aware of their vulnerability to 
the effects of such structural changes, as well as their restricted or complete 
lack of influence over the centers of power in the North, thus having little 
or no influence over the world forum and agenda setting before multilateral 
organizations. Thus, these countries began to act according to the rules of the 
game, basing their behavior on 1) the decline of the American relative power, 
2) the search for support by institutions that could catalyze their interests and 
3) the establishment of an ideological coherence between countries in the 
South, given the sharing of experiences in North-South relations (Krasner 
1983).
In this matter, Brazilian diplomacy adopted an approach of build-
ing strategic partnerships with developing countries based on speculative 
and pragmatic factors. While working on furthering its own interests, Bra-
zil sought to identify a new international dynamic that would consider the 
shared historical process in their relationship with the North and also includ-
ed a range of views, perceptions and ideas.
Stuenkel (2014) presents a record of Brazil’s position in relation to 
Angola after the Second World War, which was initially marked by the in-
difference of the elite in minimizing the role of blacks in the formation of 
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national identity, coming to the point that Juscelino Kubitschek declined to 
provide support for independence movements. Quadros took the first steps 
towards forming diplomatic ties in naming the black journalist Raymundo de 
Souza Dantas to head the Brazilian Embassy in Accra and welcoming the em-
bassies of Ghana and Senegal (the first African embassies in Latin America). 
General Castelo Branco viewed Africa as a continent of little importance to his 
policy, only monitoring the context of the “communist threat.” 
In the 1970s the scenario changed and relations between Brazil and 
other countries intensified. According to Borges Filho (1985), the recognition 
of the independence by president Geisel was based on the premises of a prag-
matic and responsible foreign policy towards such new international behavior, 
as he recognized that the MPLA was the only Angolan party with popular 
representation and support. However, this seems to present an ambiguity in 
terms of ideology, which is explained by former Ambassador Paulo de Tarso 
Flecha de Lima: “it was a right-wing government and was a left-wing policy 
to strongly promote the interests of more conservative segments of society” 
(Borges Filho 1985, 12). Along these lines, according to Cunha (2002), what 
draws attention to the recognition of independence conveys more than the 
political act itself:
Part of the strategy to place Brazil as a bridge between the interests of the 
first and the third world. (...) On the one hand, it guaranteed Brazil a privi-
leged foothold in Angola and the opening of new fronts in Africa, particu-
larly in Portuguese-speaking countries. On the other, the role of “Western 
interlocutor” by the MPLA.
The relations with Africa again became cold under the government of 
Collor who returned to the United States (in the 1980s trade with Africa ac-
counted for 10% of the Brazil’s foreign trade, which was reduced to 2% under 
Collor). Under Lula, the relationship Brazilian-African gained unprecedented 
momentum, with 12 trips to the continent in his first term, the opening of 34 
embassies on the continent, and the influx of Brazilian investments in Angola 
after its independence in 1975 increased to US$ 18 million by 2002, and to 
US$ 1 billion by 2012 (Badin and Morosini 2014). 
With approaches ranging between idealism and realism in the con-
duct of foreign policy, Lula stepped up the approach towards Angolan-Brazil-
ian cooperation with a speech extolling the shared culture and language be-
tween the two countries, as well as the historical debt to the continent whilst 
seeking change relationship bases with the North (Vigevani and Cepaluni 
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2011).4
It is in this context of a combination of internal and external condi-
tions that the Capanda project was initiated, being one of the first infrastruc-
ture works in post-independence, the greatest work of construction of this 
kind on the continent and the most important for the Odebrecht that, encour-
aged by the Brazilian government began its internationalization process.
The Capanda construction is considered the most important infra-
structure project in the post-independence era, being the largest construction 
work of this kind in the African continent. It began in the mid of the 1980s 
and its construction involves important empirical elements that demonstrates 
the presence of idealistic and realist approaches in practical Brazilian foreign 
policy and an important step towards the consolidation of the internationali-
zation process of the Odebrecht.
Building Capanda: a model
In a reference to the Angola Energy Resources Survey 1980, the envi-
ronmental impact report for the construction of Laúca dam commissioned by 
the Middle Kwanza Exploitation Office (GAMEK) pointed out the hydroelec-
tric potential of the Kwanza River:
[…] the most notable of which, in terms of hydroelectric generating poten-
tial, was the Kwanza River, a finding that served to confirm the SONEFE 
studies. Based on the results obtained, a decision was taken within the 
scope of Angola’s infrastructure restructuring process to invest in the hy-
droelectric potential of the Middle Kwanza River Basin through construc-
tion of the Capanda Dam, which entered into operation in 2004 with an 
installed capacity of 520 MW.5
Angola recognized this project’s importance to the country, especial-
ly for the city of Luanda and the surrounding region. However, in terms of 
resources, the new Angolan government was fully involved with the war. For 
this reason, until then the government had considered modernizing the Cam-
bambe dam complex to expand its production, rather than start a new project 
from scratch in an inhospitable area with no minimal infrastructure and with 
limited funding from the former Soviet Union to supply equipment only.
4  Regarding the historical evolution of the Brazilian position towards Africa see Penna Filho 
and Lessa 2007; Pinheiro 2007; Stuenkel 2014.  
5  Accessed May 21, 2015. http://www.oekb.at/de/osn/DownloadCenter/projekt-und-umwelta-
nalysen/U807-Final-Report-May-2013.pdf
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On the other hand, in the late 1970s and early 1980s Petrobras (the 
Brazilian oil company owned by the government), suffering with internation-
al financial crises and oil producer boycotts, entered into Angolan oil explo-
ration contracts. (Toscano 2004; Fletcher 1996). By helping Odebrecht par-
ticipate in the bidding of Capanda and in the construction process, Petrobras 
could increase the oil volume purchased by the Brazilian government, thus 
benefitting Brazil. Hence the solution to the problem may appear to have 
been the result of both corporate-private and corporate-state strategy.
The obstacles for Angola, Brazil, and Odebrecht were overcome ac-
cording to the document The Future in Construction6 in the following way:
Marc Altit, who acted as director of business development in the interna-
tional area of Odebrecht, has structured an innovative contract with many 
variables and a guarantee mechanism: the oil produced by Angola. The 
idea was presented to the Brazilian government, which although resisted 
the novelty, had welcomed the prospect of having a reliable source of oil at 
a stage when international prices were high and there was great contention 
for the product. Thus, it was that in early 1982, the Brazilian financing 
transaction was authorized (p.84 - Emphasis added). 
 
It is not the intention of this work to present a complete picture of 
the grandeur of the Capanda works nor even present to the reader with highly 
technical and complex information about energy generation.7 It is sufficing 
to say that when it became operational in 2004 the plant began to produce 
520 MW, enough to supply electricity to the cities of Malanje and Luanda with 
734,000 and 2,449,000 inhabitants respectively (Angolan Statistical Insti-
tute), which according to African Dams Briefing 2010:
Capanda Dam is the largest ever civil construction project in Angola and 
provides power to the cities of Malange and Luanda. An estimated $4 bil-
lion has been invested in the project. It was started in 1986 with a state 
investment of $750 million paid in oil supplies to foreign companies (In-
ternational Rivers 2010 - Emphasis added).
The deal planned was formally concluded in 1984 between the Ango-
6  A document published in 2009 by Odebrecht for occasion of the celebration of the 25th 
anniversary of the signing of the contract for the construction of Capanda. Although it is an 
advertising piece and provided a one-sided view of the process, the document brings interest-
ing aspects that are not found in other materials and its comparison with other documents 
analyzed do not show incompatibility or bias that disqualifies as empirical evidence. Available 
at the Library of the Law School of São Paulo-FGV.
7  For a technical analysis of the construction we suggest: Fedosov 2000.
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lan Government and a consortium formed by Odebrecht and Technopromex-
port for the construction of the Capanda dam in Malanje province. The con-
tract stated the initial cost estimated at US$ 650 million - the largest involving 
the participation of a Brazilian company overseas – to provide engineering 
services that would be partially paid by Angola using oil (10,000 barrels/day). 
Technopromexport was responsible to the supply and install the necessary 
equipment for operation (Santana 2003, 22). 
It is important to note that this was not the first contract between the 
two companies, as both companies had already participated in a joint project 
of irrigation and power generation in Olmos, Peru in 1979. Therefore, when 
the Angolan government decided to launch the construction bidding process, 
Technopromexport executives suggested to Odebrecht executives thus: “Why 
not Capanda in Angola?” (The Future in Construction, p.83 and Zebinden, Oli-
va and Gaspar 2007).
According to Fragoso (1984) and Calcagnoto (1985), it was exactly 
during the second half of the 1970s that progressive emphasis took place in 
relation to the export of Brazilian technology and service sales operations - 
specifically in the areas of civil engineering, connected to business enterprise, 
such as the construction of industrial plants and infrastructure projects in-
volving the construction of roads, railways and hydropower.
Cooperation agreements and exploration contracts that can be seen 
as the result of the adoption of the strategy mentioned by Minister Antonio F. 
Azeredo da Silveira in that 1976 secret memorandum:
What impressed me most after hearing those evaluations was that the price 
factor per barrel of oil is today a less determinant element than it was a few 
years ago. I believe, therefore, that while it is indispensable to endeavor to 
obtain the lowest possible price, it is even more important that, in the final 
analysis, the net balance for Brazilian trade should be the least negative 
possible. For this reason, it seems to me essential that oil purchases always 
be made in parallel with the sale of Brazilian products to the suppliers of 
that fuel (Wilson Center 1976 - Emphasis added).
In the same memorandum as mentioned before for President Geis-
el, Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, after a meeting regarding the main aims 
of Brazilian International Petroleum Policy with several Petrobras directors, 
Scholl Isnard, Carlos Sant’Anna and Plínio Junqueira, he wrote:
Dr. Isnard, in particular, made a thorough investigation of the principles 
that guide the oil purchase policy followed by our State Company. He 
stressed the dominant concern with the assurance of supply, which has in-
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spired origin diversification initiatives and categories of suppliers that have 
been adopted lately. He gave the recent purchases of Nigerian, Mexican 
and Algerian oil. as examples. As a counterbalance to the effects of the cost 
increases generated by this question, Director Isnard stressed that PETRO-
BRÁS has been increasingly interested in pursuing trade opportunities that 
may bring a better balance for global Brazilian purchases (Wilson Center 
1976).
Following this strategy in the case of Iraq, Interbrás (a subsidiary of 
Petrobras created in 1976) emerged as an arms-length trading of BRASPET-
RO. The official justification for the creation of this entity was to leverage 
Petrobras’ purchasing power to promote a state-incentive policy regarding the 
export of Brazilian enterprises’ goods and services. 
During the Brazilian currency crisis, Interbrás signed, with the inter-
mediation of Petrobras, a barter agreement with Iraq in which Brazil exported 
manufactured goods and received payment in oil. To that end, a symbolic 
exchange contract was put in place to feed the Brazilian Central Bank’s data-
sets. In this operation, the negotiated structure involved consisted of: a) The 
construction services rendered by Mendes Junior; b) Banco do Brasil granting 
credit to enable the exportation of services; c) The payment was to be made by 
the Iraqi government part in cash and part in oil barrels; d) The transfer of the 
credits regarding the oil barrels to Interbrás/BRASPETRO by Mendes Junior; 
and e) The payment to Mendes Junior.
This case is a form of counterpurchase that in the words of Mensah 
(1989, 14) is:
A scheme whereby an exporting country sells to a foreign trade organi-
zation and contractually agrees to make reciprocal purchases from that 
organization, or from another commercial agency in the same country, 
within a specified period of time (often of a short-term duration). It oper-
ates through the use of two separate contracts which may be linked by a 
Protocol.
In order to be compatible with the expectations of a countertrade op-
eration, a network of contracts had to be in place between Angola and the 
consortium to facilitate the operation (De la Rosa 2011, 27; Fletcher 1996). 
The contract network was set up as follows: a) in September 1982 an 
umbrella contract was signed between the Government of Angola and Con-
sortium Capanda, b) in December 1983 the Credit Agreement between An-
gola and Banco do Brasil was set up, c) in November 1984 an amendment 
was made to the Master Contract and General Conditions of Contract, and d) 
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in the same month in which they enter into the Consultancy and Technical 
Assistance Agreements between GAMEK and FURNAS (Revista Furnas, year 
XXXI, nº 322, July 2005 and Decreto Presidencial 26/84, published at the 
Diário da República, series I, No 263 of December 1st, 1984 -attached at the 
end of this work). Furthermore, there was the need to set up an internal con-
tractual network to secure the intervention of the Banco do Brasil to provide 
credit advancing and flow in order to start the project, which made it neces-
sary to create a line of credit that, according to some analysts, absorbed US $ 
1.5 billion (Pinheiro 1987). 
Upon completion of this contractual network, the challenge was the 
construction and delivering promises made. The construction plans started 
in 1985 with Odebrecht taking measures regarding the safety of workers and 
equipment, as well as making plans to gain access to the construction site that 
was located in a region where armed conflicts were still in place. The building 
works at the site initiated in 1987 (Francisco 2004).
Although the project foresaw starting power generation in Decem-
ber 1993, the UNITA attacks at the end of 1992 led to the disruption of ac-
tivities and the evacuation of the construction site (Francisco 2004). From 
1992 to 1994 the construction site was under the control of UNITA, causing 
severe damages to the previously constructed structure, which continued to 
deteriorate even after UNITA left the site in 1994 as it was then occupied by 
the population living in the region and by the Angolan military army (Fran-
cisco 2004). During successive periods of occupation, the structure did not 
receive any maintenance that could preserve it for a period of approximately 
five years, which meant losing a significant portion of the initial investment 
(Francisco 2004).
In May 1997, the parties resumed a series of technical visits and in-
spections with the aim of establishing an infrastructure recovery plan that 
was set in motion in 1998. The construction site was attacked in 1999 and 
the work halted once again until January 2000. However, this time, contrary 
to what had occurred previously, the site was under the control of the Angolan 
army. This prevented attacks further damaging construction that had been 
made up to that point. The work resumed in January 2000 (Francisco 2004).
Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that the country had been plunged 
into civil war, and that the works were taking place in an inhospitable region 
without infrastructure 450 km from Luanda, there was still the problem of the 
lack of skilled workers. The strategy of Odebrecht to overcome this challenge 
was crucial for business continuity in the country. 
The company adopted an approach that favored the gradual replace-
ment of Brazilian employees initially sent on a large scale, by local workers 
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trained throughout the construction phases with the help of special programs. 
In the first year of the construction of Capanda, there were 1,100 Brazilians 
and 300 Angolans. In 1992 at the work’s zenith, out of 4,200 employees, 530 
were Brazilian. In its 2013 activity report CO reports that Angola makes up its 
third largest workforce (9,169 employees), behind Brazil (127,166) and Peru 
(10,541), thus being one of the largest private employers in the country.
Much time has passed by since the beginning of the project and so 
many dramatic events occurred during its execution that its completion was 
no longer seen as a technical challenge or even merely the performance of a 
contractual obligation. Those involved in the project came to see it more as a 
demonstration of victory than the carrying out of a duty. The finished project 
was delivered to the Angolan government in 2002 at an estimated total cost 
of US$ 4 billion, of which US$ 400 million resulted from damages caused by 
the civil war (Francisco 2004). Therefore, the case is representative in the way 
that Odebrecht adopted a contingency approach, meaning that the company 
transformed the needs of the states (Brazil needed oil and Angola needed in-
frastructure but had no money) into a window of opportunity, so these factors 
determine a model for entering into a new foreign market, and keeping the 
business by building thrust (Turnbull 1987; Okoroafo 2001).
It is important to emphasize that in addition to the direct economic 
benefits generated by Capanda, Odebrecht received an additional benefit: the 
knowledge of creating and operating a subsidiary abroad enabled it to become 
specialized in international business brokerage, as had occurred with Petro-
bras by virtue of its international operations with BRASPETRO. Odebrecht 
also made use of its accumulated experience in coping with complex situa-
tions during the construction planning and execution abroad, enabling it to 
become a market broker (empresariadora de mercados) (Wosiak and Nique 
2007), thereby diversifying its operations beyond participation in tenders of 
infrastructure construction. With this knowledge of the international engi-
neering and construction services market, the company is now able to pro-
vide diverse planning and development projects and expand and consolidate 
relationship networks between subcontractors and service suppliers (Wosiak 
and Nique 2007). This is what Wosiak and Nique (2007, 36) called “delegated 
entrepreneurship”, as described in their words:
 
Odebrecht not only generates income for the country, but also provides 
conditions for small and medium enterprises to also conquer opportunities 
in the international business arena. Of the approximately 1,700 exporters 
partner suppliers, about 1,550 are small and medium-sized companies that 
would not export alone and whose exports of goods and services brought 
approximately US $ 2 billion to Brazil between 2000 and 2005, Thanks 
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to Odebrecht contracts, these companies export food, steel products, light 
and heavy equipment, clothing, electrical materials, tools, engineering and 
environmental studies, and other technology -intensive products.
However, that could easily qualify as “intermediation” that, accord-
ing to the document entitled “Odebrecht Entrepreneurial Technology” (TEO), 
which provides the ethical, moral and conceptual blueprint for members of 
the Organization’s actions. The potential of human beings is valued, such as 
the willingness to serve, the capacity and desire to evolve and the will to over-
come results. The document also provides for a planned delegation process, 
based on trust and partnership between leaders and subordinates.
According to Roberto Dias, director of institutional relations of the 
Odebrecht Group: 
Our team also has the advantage of bringing on board several Brazilian 
companies to develop our work. They consist of design firms, suppliers of 
building materials, equipment, vehicles, and even suppliers of supermar-
ket items. Thus, they not only represent Brazil abroad but also further the 
country’s own interests and, as it turns out, that of Brazilian business itself 
(Engenharia v. 580, 2007, 75- emphasis added). 
In addition to the condition assumed by Odebrecht as an intermme-
diate, which for us presents the elements of corporate paradiplomacy, the 
company also started to interject in the cultural arena in recognizing and pro-
moting cultural bonds between the two countries and people.
According to Cunha (2002), the company has adopted a clear strat-
egy. The company has sponsored some Angolan-focused initiatives, such as 
the African music group Ile Aiye Bahia’s CD record, as well as the Angola 
Week event held in Salvador (State of Bahia), and has promoted television 
debates between Brazilian personalities and Angolan authorities, in which 
Angola took every opportunity to demonstrate that it was there “to stay”. In 
an interview with Francisco (2004), a director of the Brazilian company, he 
mentions that one of the strategies to convince the representatives of the An-
golan government of the existing cultural proximity between the Brazilian 
company and the African country was to present it as a “baiana” company and 
use Bahia as a synecdoche for Brazil. To achieve this, numerous events were 
conducted to highlight the cultural links between Bahia and Angola (Francis-
co 2004). 
An example of this partnership is the Casa de Angola, a cultural 
center that “aims to consolidate the cultural ties between Brazil and Angola, 
enabling the Bahian community access to Angolan culture in particular and 
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to Africa in general,” created by Angolan Embassy’s initiative in Brazil, with 
support from the Government of the State of Bahia, Municipality of Salvador, 
and Odebrecht (there is no evidence at this point of the volume invested to set 
up or to sustain the activities).
In this context, this paper expands the analysis of the business strat-
egies adopted by Odebrecht vis-a-vis the theoretical framework comprised of 
transnational theory and the practice of corporate paradiplomacy. The next 
section aims to present an analysis showing how and to what extent Odebre-
cht began to influence the formation of public policies on both sides of the 
Atlantic.
Transnacionalism and Paradiplomacy in the actions of 
Odebrecht 
 
Nowadays globalization is undoubtedly a phenomenon with norma-
tive pressure and a decisive policy presence in international relations, putting 
pressure on States to become minimalist, increasingly deregulating the mar-
ket and embracing free trade to focus exclusively on the functions of state, 
while civil society takes on more control over operations and other actors 
emerge with importance in political, institutional and legal dimensions (Du-
pas 2005; Matthews 1997). In recent decades, we have increasingly seen the 
development of some positive aspects in terms of policy that may translate 
into a greater number of elected governments, which in turn start to adopt 
policies related to economic liberalization, law’s empire and respect for hu-
man rights. 
Paradoxically, these achievements have the power to weaken the 
state while strengthening the participation of civil society in the course of 
world politics, bringing new and powerful players who come to compete with 
the state on some fronts given their influence or economic power, thereby 
marking a profound change in local and global economies, defying the ba-
sic understanding of the world order to expand the forms of regulation and 
governance. Thus,  the heavy investments in infrastructure are made by the 
international investment funds, foreign companies or the establishment of 
public-private partnerships; the minimum realization of the human rights or 
environmental protection depends on the direct and decisive participation of 
the non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and the rating agencies have a 
significant impact on how countries conduct economic policies, constitutes 
a direct link between how successful states are in implementing their public 
policies  and  the performance of the non-state actors in maintaining opera-
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tions around the world, thereby, generating a new dynamic policy and reality 
in the relations between these units.8
The communication improvements that technology has brought the 
world has had great influence upon this process, with information being 
quickly disseminated and shared, especially among countries’ elites (in this 
sense not only the rich, but interest groups), Whether developed or devel-
oping, such elites possess shared values and identities. Thus, the prolifera-
tion of non-governmental organizations with various agendas has spread to 
such an extent that they are now increasingly responsible and more effective 
in providing, for example, humanitarian aid, than the United Nations itself 
(Mathews 1997).
TNCs embarked on this process at the end of the Cold War, which 
encouraged increased economic exchanges among nations, with private in-
vestment increasing six fold in relation to the international aid system led by 
World Bank and IMF (Garten 2002, 156). TNCs also greatly benefitted from 
increased communications speed, taking into account that in business agility 
is critical. For them, operations can take seconds whilst for states and their 
bureaucratic structures, they can be counted in days, at best, taking into ac-
count that have the capability of response (Mathews 1997).
Conceptually, a TNC is
[…] an enterprise comprising entities in more than one country which op-
erate under a system of decision-making that permits coherent policies and 
a common strategy. The entities are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, 
that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence 
over the others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and re-
sponsibilities with the others. (UNCTAD 2015).
Regarding the expansion of the TNCs in the world, Sauvant, Mendoza 
and Ince (2008, 7) point out to 3 main factors that made it possible: 
[…] the worldwide liberalization of FDI regimes, which opens new oppor-
tunities for firms to expand; advances in transport, communication and 
information technologies, which create opportunities to manage integrated 
international production networks consisting of parent firms and their for-
eign affiliates located in various countries; and competition among firms, 
which drives firms to take advantage of these new opportunities and pos-
sibilities.
8  According Cohen and Kupçu (2005, 8), the relationship between states and non-state actors 
have the direct engagement dimensions, selective engagement or episodic burden sharing, 
non-state actors circumventing States, conflictual relations, and agenda setting.
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 The expansion to new markets requires from TNCs a set of compe-
tences such as the development of new relationships, which is incremental 
over the years as it follows the “learning by doing” model, and maintaining 
the knowledge acquired (Górska 2013; Fleury and Fleury 2011).
The expansion, however, is not without obstacles and criticism. The 
most important obstacle is the risk of direct investment commitment in un-
familiar surroundings, which is a transactional cost (Wink Junior; Sheng and 
Eid Junior 2011). As a way of dealing with this risk, the Uppsala School main-
tains that TNCs seek to start its internationalization process in culturally close 
foreign countries. The case of Odebrecht in Angola seems to confirm this 
assumption. 
Its supporters depart from liberal doctrines used in the economy to 
justify trade liberalization and free competition as factors that will benefit 
emerging markets, which traditionally receive the greatest influx of FDIs. 
Sauvant (2009, 10) even claims that “[...] they need to see the rise of TNC’s 
from emerging markets not as a threat but an additional avenue of opportuni-
ty to integrate emerging markets fully into the world economy.” On the other 
hand, some claim that the TNCs are:
[…] instruments of a market tyranny that is extending its reach across the 
planet like a cancer, colonizing ever more of the planet’s living spaces, de-
stroying livelihoods, displacing people, rendering democratic institutions 
impotent, and feeding on life in an insatiable quest for money’ The worst 
aspect of this tyranny is that it hits hardest at the most vulnerable people, 
the poor (Sauvant 2009, 10).
By looking at Capanda in light of increasingly intense movements of 
TNCs in the world and the fact that the State still remains the most important 
catalyst force of the national interest, we see interesting implications emerg-
ing as the concepts of transnationalism and paradiplomacy are applied to the 
case, confirming that Brazil chose to seek new partners to change the existing 
balance of power between the North and the South as part of its foreign policy 
strategy (Fletcher 1996). In this sense, its approach to Angola occurred natu-
rally considering the shared history between two countries with regard to Por-
tugal and their shared language, arguments that were later on amplified by 
Lula in his speech suggesting that Brazil has a “historical debt” with Angola.
This approach towards Angola was made via the promotion of in-
vestments granted to Brazilian companies that decided to invest in Angola by 
Banco do Brasil and the BNDES. This contract contained a collateral clause 
(called the Angola model), which according to Corkin (2012, 7): “As in the 
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Chinese case, the loan is also collateralized by oil. The Angolan government 
has pledged to provide 20,000 barrels of oil per day to guarantee the loan.”9 
Upon this model, the relations between the countries progressed strongly to 
other fronts of cooperation and development.10
The foundations laid by Capanda made it possible for Odebrecht to 
stay in Angola up until the present day, leading to increasing involvement in 
infrastructure projects and mining. This has occurred because: 1) CO kept its 
commitment to the project even during the civil war; 2) the government and 
its agents possess a good reputation, and 3) especially its involvement with 
Angolan society in developing ground rules that generated social develop-
ment (Roberto Dias in Engenharia vol. 580, 2007, 75). 
The concept of paradiplomacy refers to a set of activities or initiatives 
undertaken by provinces, states, municipalities, autonomous communities 
as in Spain, landers in Germany and oblasts in Russia to promote their inter-
ests, without interfering with the state foreign policy (Soldatos 1990). In this 
sense, Kuznetsov (2015, 3) states that: 
[...] paradiplomatic activities, even if they only include the articulation of 
some regional “private interest” often represent the force within the state 
from its lower levels, which plays a significant role in shaping the foreign 
and domestic policies of the central governments.
The introduction of new players in this scenario is part of the process 
of globalization and transnationalization, which has been characterized by 
the increasingly active participation of TNCs in spheres once dominated by 
governments alone, influencing public policies to some extent whilst setting 
up business, thus practicing corporate diplomacy (Dasie 2011).
Kuznetsov (2015, 50) teaches that paradiplomacy operates in 11 possi-
ble dimensions ranging from traditional paradiplomacy to the dimension of 
globalization, which for the purpose of study the dimension of interest is the 
link between transnationalism and the activism of the TNCs.
Thus, the presence of new actors with great political importance and 
capable of producing changes in the international system becomes critical to 
understand the paradiplomacy practiced by the TNCs. In this sense:
[. . .] The point is merely that states are still the primary medium through 
9  See also Zongwe 2010. 
10  “In 2008, Angola was Brazil´s second largest African trading partner, comprising 16% of 
Brazil´s total trade with Africa, after Nigeria (32%)” (Corkin 2012, 7).
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which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled 
into the world system. It may be that non- state actors are becoming more 
important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately 
happens through states. In this sense states are still being the center of the 
international system. (Kuznetsov 2015, 75)
In this same sense, Senhoras (2011, 2) states “corporate paradiploma-
cy” refers to companies’ international operations covered by a set of guide-
lines, principles and strategic practices that display greater autonomy from 
state diplomacy. Autonomy understands the premise that corporate paradi-
plomacy has different incentives from those that explain the actions of state 
diplomacy, although sometimes they may develop simultaneously, in parallel 
to each other and may, in certain situations, share the same interests. He also 
considers the hypothesis that the relative position within a network of rela-
tions is essential to build power, whether it is political (in the case of the State), 
or economic (in the case of a company). It is clear that some past events, in-
volving the Angolan State and the Brazilian State, and the Odebrecht compa-
ny can be seen as clues to measure the results of this strategy: Brazil was the 
only State with whom Angola managed to solve the payment of external debt, 
from 1980s to 2000s. Still, Odebrecht is the largest foreign company acting 
in the country. The framework of organized “exchanges” is most likely rooted 
in these results, previously based on countertrade economic operations.
While the drivers for State diplomacy are the national interest, mac-
roeconomic stability and peacekeeping, for TNCs the motivations are the 
need for growth, increasing returns (profits) and increase in production scale. 
There is, however, an interest in which is possible to see an alignment be-
tween both: access to scarce natural resources.
The concept of paradiplomacy also allows the theoretical exploration 
of another dimension of autonomy: the issue of dependence on business-state 
relationships in the international arena. The mutual dependence between 
TNCs and nation states can be traced from the creation of large mercantile 
companies, for instance, through the comment attributed to Charles E. Wil-
son Eisenhower that what is good for GM is good for the United States.
In addition, the efforts in keeping up with Capanda in spite of variable 
conditions might be explained as a strategic position adopted by Odebrecht 
in obtaining the privileged position as “broker” for the Angolan State. In both 
situations it is obvious that the relative position within a network of relation-
ships is essential to the construction of power, be it political (for the state), or 
economic (for the company) as pointed out by Fletcher (1996). In this sense, 
Brazil was the only state with whom Angola was able to renegotiate its foreign 
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debt from the 1980s up to the present day. According to Moreira (2006) the 
Brazil - Angola Memorandum of Understanding (MEBA) signed at the end 
of the 1980s, and renewed twice (in the 1990s and 2000s) enabled Angola to 
have access to US$ 1 billion and for Brazil in turn to receive oil from Angola, 
which amortized the debt and regained 45% of the payment in the form of 
new loans to import Brazilian goods and services. Also, according to Moreira 
(2006), on April 2004 the renegotiations resulted in granting an additional 
credit of US$ 150 million to Angola until 2006.11
In addition to the legal and political aspects of the Odebrecht opera-
tions in Angola, its relationship with civil society and its ability to alter indi-
vidual and collective status during and after the construction of Capanda were 
important to the business continuation to enjoy relatively good reputation be-
fore the civil society, which makes important contributions to our hypothesis.
One of the most important connections between the company and 
Angolan society was built through the company’s workforce in the country. 
As seen before in this study the company decided to increase as much as pos-
sible the local workforce. Angolan personnel started working on low-skilled 
jobs, but after receiving training and incorporating the company’s values, 
they started to gradually fill higher-level positions in different sectors. There 
are plenty of stories reinforcing the company´s discourse regarding employee 
qualification and its positive impact on their lives in the company´s web jour-
nal Odebrecht Informa, for instance:  
Odebrecht has brought a lot to Angola, mainly the empowerment of peo-
ple. One of my children, for example, studied to be a power technician 
in the company, working at Capanda. After he was demobilized, he had 
no trouble finding another job. (…) The qualification made the difference 
(Odebrecht - Emphasis added).
The investments made in the training of local people are one of the 
factors that promotes continuity and stability for business in Angola. Nowa-
days Odebrecht has 27.000 locals working for it:
Training workers is an essential part of every project implemented by Ode-
brecht. As of mid-2012, 79,000 Angolans have benefited from the compa-
ny’s training programs. University student recruits receive special training 
and are prepared to occupy senior positions in the company. In major pro-
jects, Odebrecht also offers technical training for the population living in 
the surrounding areas, preparing any interested young people – not just 
11  There is hypothesis that sees the discourses of friendship and historical debt as a form of 
sub imperialism (Bieler 2004).
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potential employees – for construction jobs. These technical courses are 
provided through the company’s “Believing program”, which so far has 
trained some 3,000 workers in its three Angolan units (Odebrecht).
According to the accounts of Justino Amaro, the first Angolan employ-
ee promoted to the post of manager, Capanda served as a “school of the elite” 
that trained technicians, who afterwards went to fill up important positions in 
government and business. He was one of the first employees who faced the 
hardships of jungle and civil war, and in staying at Odebrecht, they provided 
to him with the means to support him to continue his distance-learning stud-
ies in economics, even taking courses in Brazil.12
This trend is also found in the report provided by Rufino Alvarez, a 
Peruvian Odebrecht employee for over 25 years. He went to Angola in 2009 
to work in a two-front job. He describes his role in his own words: “I have one 
job at the work site and another teaching Angolans, so that this country can 
continue to grow” (Osava).
These are only two examples that show the compromise with the TEO 
that is a set of principles and concepts directed to the making of a policy of 
corporate responsibility focused on the formation and the evolution of the 
human being,
Training workers is an essential part of every project implemented by Ode-
brecht. As of mid-2012, 79,000 Angolans had benefited from the compa-
ny’s training programmes. University student recruits receive special train-
ing and are groomed to occupy senior positions in the company. In major 
projects, Odebrecht also offers technical training for the population living 
in the surrounding areas, preparing any interested young people – not just 
potential employees – for construction jobs. These technical courses are 
provided through the company’s Believing programme, which so far has 
trained some 3,000 workers in its three Angola units.13
 
Given its economic weight and its social presence, the company is 
in a position to influence the conduction of some public and social policies 
in the country (despite the complaints of slave labor by Brazilian personnel), 
thus, acting as a true paradiplomatic agent, for instance:
12  Accessed June 22, 2015. http://www.democraciaycooperacion.net/espacio-colaborativo/
america-latina/adjunta-tus-documentos-parael/traducciones/portugues-387/article/a-diplo-
macia-da-construcao-angola
13  Accessed June 22, 2015. http://odebrecht.com/pt-br/organizacao-odebrecht/tecnologia-em-
presarial-odebrecht
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This year the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht will invest between 800 
million to one billion dollars in the country’s most diverse areas; it was 
announced on Wednesday, in Luanda, by its head, Emilio Odebrecht, at 
the end of a meeting with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. Re-
garding the meeting, Emílio Odebrecht told journalists that he was always 
looking for an opportunity for “accountability to the President about what he 
has entrusted to us, not only in the area of service delivery but also in Brazilian 
investments in Angola” (Jornal de Economia e Finanças 2009). (Emphasis 
added)
Conclusion
It is undisputed that the news we see coming from Africa are often 
associated with humanitarian catastrophes, which background conditions are 
usually the disputes for power and low degree of institutionalization that can 
guarantee the most basic needs of its population. These two factors can be 
generalized to the continent as a whole, however, it cannot be the only ones to 
be used to draw conclusions or even promote an analysis of countries consid-
ering their individuality. In this sense, the development of models that had a 
positive impact on society, especially in periods of great turbulence that were 
the case of the decolonization processes (notwithstanding the challenges that 
arose in the period soon followed), took into account the importance of the 
foreign investment.
The development model that Odebrecht actively worked to implement 
in Angola shows traces of a very successful one in many instances, that sheds 
more light on the issue of TNC’s behavior in the international arena, which in 
the 1970s and 1980s is associated with business expansion without any cor-
porate responsibility towards developing countries whatsoever, leading to sev-
eral scandals and environmental accidents. It has had a positive impact upon 
Angolan society in a period of great turbulence, right after the decolonization 
process, followed by the civil war that left the country both economically and 
politically broken, thus in great need of FDI for reconstruction.
The construction of Capanda by Odebrecht followed this model and 
gave rise to a relationship with the government and civil society of such a 
magnitude that the company not only consolidated its position in the market, 
but also demonstrated the ability to invest in local people. Local workforce 
replaced Brazilian employees after an intense process of training and invest-
ment, including promoting a greater participation of Angolans to supervisory, 
managerial and directorial positions.
In addition, the local community is involved with other initiatives 
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such as the Program Accredited that promotes necessary construction train-
ing as well as related projects that can assist the country as a whole in the re-
construction efforts by providing the skills that locals will use for their coun-
try’s benefit.
Of course, such model is not flawless or exempt of criticism. Howev-
er, the case presents many positive dimensions that outnumber the negative 
ones, which are more related to Brazilian workers and how Brazilian labor 
law regards some aspects of working abroad than to Angolans per se. As such, 
in this context Odebrecht appears as an important agent of Brazilian foreign 
policy seeking to establish the country´s presence as an interlocutor between 
South and North, while Odebrecht internally consolidated its presence in An-
gola by building a good reputation with government and society.    
In conclusion, the evidence found in this case study indicates impor-
tant implications regarding how TNCs participate in the global arena, some-
times as precursors of Nation States seeking to implement foreign policy 
goals indirectly, thus confirming that the theoretical framework of transna-
tionalism and paradiplomacy is appropriate, although we recognize that it is 
only an initial analysis, contributing to a larger research agenda.
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ABSTRACT
The reconstruction of Angola, with the end of civil war, depended and still depends 
largely on receiving foreign investments, thus, the reason for having the Brazilian 
companies as key allies as receivers of special government credit lines. What led 
Brazil to adopt an indirectly influential stance toward Angola despite its explicit 
foreign policy directed to increase the South-South trade? What has led the Brazilian 
companies to accept the risks of doing business in a country with low political and 
institutional stability, plagued by a civil war, and without a stable international legal 
framework in place? Using the concepts of transnationalism and paradiplomacy 
as theoretical framework, the answers to these questions will be discussed in this 
article, which focuses on the case of the construction and expansion of the Capanda 
hydroelectric plant.
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